

Discourses of the “1965’s Bloody Coup” in Indonesian Education Historiography

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Abstract: This article examined the discourse about the 1965’s bloody coup. The study was motivated by the controversy that has long been grown in Indonesian society about who is the mastermind of the incident. The problem studied is what kind of discourse about the 1965’s bloody coup taught to high school students? The method used was discourse analysis to the content of high school history textbook from Indonesia New Order era (1966-1998) to Reformation era (1998-now). The results show that in the New Order era, history textbooks produced a discourse that Indonesia Communist Party was the antagonistic mastermind of the 1965’s bloody coup. On the other hand, the Army and Major General Soeharto were the protagonistic heroes. In Reformation era, history textbooks produced a discourse that there were many interpretations toward the mastermind of the bloody coup. But the discourse was strongly protested by interest groups outside of the school.

Keywords: Education Historiography, Textbook, Indonesia, History, Army, New Order, Communist Party

1. Introduction

One of the current events in Indonesia that suck a lot of public attention was Symposium of the tragedy of 1965. The symposium is organized by the government on April 18 to 19, 2016. The *Jakarta Post* (April 19, 2016) reported:

Survivors of the 1965 tragedy have called for reconciliation through the revelation of the truth behind the mass killing of members and sympathizers of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and their families. It is believed that at least half a million people were killed...

Haryono, spokesman of Lembaga Perjuangan Rehabilitasi Korban Orde Baru, an NGO working for the rehabilitation of New Order regime victims, said many people had become victims of the 1965 killings, thus, it was important for the government to extend an apology.

The symposium had caused controversy. Some mass organizations do not agree with the measures of the government and sounding their opinions in various ways. One of the opponents is an organization calling itself as the Front Pancasila. Chairman of the Front Pancasila, Shidki Wahab, said that the symposium was to assess the tendency to revive communism and legitimize PKI as victims of human rights violations. Spokesman Front Pancasila, Alfian Tanjung, asked the government to stop or not to hold the symposium. At the end of press conference, Front Pancasila burned the flag of the Communist Party of Indonesia (*VOA Indonesia*, April 18, 2016).

A few days earlier, another opposition group broke up a meeting of victims of the 1965 tragedy. The meeting was conducted to prepare for the symposium. Islamic Defenders Front (*Front Pembela*

Islam/FPI), Pancasila Youth (*Pemuda Pancasila*) and the Police on Thursday, 14 April 2016 dissolved the preparatory meeting which was held in Bogor (*Merdeka.com* Thursday, April 14, 2016, 22:47). As a result, the victims of the 1965 tragedy that all of them have aged were forced to stay in the office of the Jakarta Legal Aid office.

Demonstrations also occurred after the 1965's Symposium Tragedy ends. The various community organizations in East Java rallied in front of the Grahadi State House, Surabaya, Thursday, April 28, 2016. They urged the government to not apologize to the victims of the 1965 tragedy. In addition, they also denied the resurrection of the ideology of communism in Indonesia (*Tempo* Thursday, April 28, 2016). The symposium and the rejection show that there are quite sharp disagreements about the tragedy of 1965 in contemporary Indonesian people. The question that arises is why the controversy happened? If we look closely, the controversy is mainly related to who was behind the tragedy of 1965. On the one hand, the victims think that they never made a mistake as alleged. On the other hand, the opponents of the symposium believed that the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was the mastermind behind the 1965's bloody coup.

Historically, the 1965's tragedy was a bloody coup movement that occurred on 30 September 1965, midnight or early hours of October 1. The coup could be quickly broken. At 19:15 Special Forces troops under the command of Sarwo Edhi Wibowo had managed to recapture the Radio of Republic of Indonesian (RRI) building and Center of Telecommunication building which formerly controlled by the perpetrators of the coup. On October 3, the bodies of Army leaders, the victims coup movement, can be found in the area of Lubang Buaya, south of the main base of Halim Perdana Kusuma airport.

The bloody coup of September 30 Movement became an unspeakable tragedy when Major General Soeharto, Commander of Army Strategic Reserve Command stated that PKI was the mastermind of the September 30th Movement. The accusation was followed by a ban on the PKI and its mass organizations, as well as a military operation to swept of its members and sympathizers. Military operations in order to purge members and sympathizers of the PKI was then known as the tragedy of 1965 and claimed many victims. Since January 1966, under the command of Major General Soeharto, the army carried out arrests and massacres against people accused of being members of the Communist Party. Outside number of people who were killed, many people were imprisoned without trial. To back up military operation, the Army used civil spy and mass organizations outside the PKI, such as Muhammadiyah youth, Marhaen youth, and Nahdlatul Ulama's militant youth wing that is called as *Barisan Ansor Serbaguna Nahdlatul Ulama* (Banser). They were used to get involved in sweeping out of PKI operations. The military operations were subsided in early 1967 when Major General Soeharto would be sworn in as president. According to the government version of the death toll is 80,000 people. However, according to the research of the National Commission on Human Rights, the death toll reached 500,000 up to 1.5 million people. The number was doubled when added to their family. During the New Order government (1966 - 1998), a family which it's member was classified as member and sympathizer of the PKI obtains discriminatory treatment, whether social, economic or political. New Order did not allow them to become civil servants, soldiers and police, and the various positions that

relate to governance. Even in some cases, children of PKI's member and sympathizer are also not allowed to attend school.

Allegations made by General Soeharto that the PKI was the mastermind of the bloody coup of 30 September 1965 is doubtful. Foreign historians, especially North American historians, found that the bloody coup was caused by internal competition and conflicts among the Army leaders. On the other hand, the Indonesian historians who doing research on the arrest and imprisonment victims found out that they know nothing about the bloody coup. They also never thought of treason, so it balked once accused was involved in the bloody coup of 30 September 1965. Revealing the truth and reconciliation processes undertaken by the government is a very important step in solving the human right problem in the past. Another problem that also interesting is how the bloody coup of 30 September 1965 taught to high school students. From this viewpoint, teaching the bloody coup of 30 September 1965 should on the same line with the reconciliation processes. In order to understand the teaching of a bloody coup, this study will focus on the discourse that was produced and distributed by school textbooks. The main question of this study is what kind of discourses of the bloody coup narrated that were produced on the high school history textbooks? Did the teaching of history reveal various versions of studies by historians? To answer that question, this study will examine the narratives of the bloody coup of 30 September 1965 contained in history textbooks from the New Order era until the Reformation and its influence on the views of the students.

2. Methodology

Politically, periodization of Indonesian history since the independence proclamation on 17 August 1945 is split into three periods, called the Soekarno era (1945-1965), the New Order or Soeharto era (1966-1998), and the Reformation era (1998 – now). This study examines six history textbooks. Three books were widely used in the New Order era and three books used in the Reformation era. Three books from the New Order period are (1) Notosusanto and Basri (1981/1992) *The National History of Indonesia for High School*; (2) Badrika (1997) *The National and World History for High School*; and (3) Waridah, Sukardi and Sunarto (2000) *The National and World History for High School*. Notosusanto and Basri book was first published in 1981 and reprinted in 1992. It was used as an obligatory textbook by Department of Education. The book was used by other writers as a primary source in writing history textbooks in the later period. On the other hand, Badrika (1997) is chosen because it was seen by history teachers as a good history textbook. Waridah, Sukardi, and Sunarto (2000) textbook is chosen because it was published at the end of the New Order era and still used during the transition period at the beginning of the Reformation era.

For the Reformation era, books that selected are (1) Angkasa et al., (2007) *History for High School*; (2) Tarunasena, (2009). *History for High School*; and (3) Sardiman and Lestariningsih (2014) *History of Indonesia*. Each of the three represented a national curriculum that applies in Indonesia during the Reformation era, the curriculum of 2004, 2006 and 2013. The last two books are obligatory school textbooks because Department of Education since implementing a curriculum of 2006 uses national

selection board, called *Badan Standar Nasional Pendidikan* (Board of National Education Standard), to choose school textbooks that are most qualified and appropriate for Indonesian education.

It is a fact that much of our knowledge is typically constructed and reproduced by discourse (Van Dijk, 2004). History as an event had already gone and none can describe as complete as the historical event. From this point of view, history narration couldn't be treated as a reflection of the objective reality of the past event, but rather as a discourse produced by historians in accordance with their ideals (Poespoprodjo, 1987) and academic rules. More Purwanto (in Purwanto and Adam, 2005) stated that the reconstruction of history is a subjective product of a process of intellectual understanding that represented in symbols of language or narrative and changeable from time to time, from one place to another, or from one person to another.

From the view of history as a discourse, history textbook is one of the most prominent subjects that represent the existence of the discourses, especially discourses that are produced by interest group outside of the school. Borrowing view of Apple (1993), the lessons of history could be seen as a vast engine of democracy: opening horizons, ensuring mobility, and so on. But for others, the lessons of history is strikingly different. It is seen as a form of social control, or, perhaps, as the embodiment of cultural dangers, and threaten the moral universe of the students who attend them ”.

To understand the discourse production and distribution, this research is directed to examine history textbooks using discourse analysis approach formulated by van Dijk (Rosidi, 2007). In the view of van Dijk, discourse lies in the structure, because "if we want to provide a structural description of discourse, we might start by considering it as a sequence of sentences, that is, as sentences that follow each other in a specific order" (van Dijk, 1997, p. 5). Broadly speaking, discourse analysis is done through three levels of the structure, called macro structure, superstructure, and microstructure. Macro-structure refers to the overall meaning of a text. It is used to account for the various notions of global meaning, such as topic, theme, or gist (van Dijk, 1980). From this standpoint, the history textbooks to be analyzed through the use of chapter headings, sub-chapters, and a summary.

The next stage of analysis is directed to the superstructure. The superstructure is the schematic form that organizes the global meaning of a text (Dijk, 1980) which form parts of the macro structure, such as setting, arguments, and the narrative framework. Which part comes first, and which partly come later, will be regulated for the sake of discourse maker. In this study superstructure analysis is done by examining the organization of the story of the 1965's tragedy that is used by the author of history textbooks.

The third phase is the microstructure, which analyzes the discourse contained in the smallest part of a text such as words, sentences, propositions, clause, paraphrasing, and images (Eriyanto, 2005). In order to do the discourse analysis, words, sentences, propositions, clause, paraphrasing, and images contained in history textbooks are seen as a manifestation of free choice or subjective expression of its author. Through the analysis of the microstructure, we will be able to obtain information on the assumptions,

ideologies, and messages that are produced and delivered by the author of history textbooks (Crawford, 2001).

3. Findings

Textbooks issued by the government, Notosusanto and Basri (1981) opens the narration of 1965's tragedy through explaining the increase of aggressiveness of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), both in national politics and in social life. It was said that "The chief calling all elements of "progressive-revolutionary force that axes to Nasakom (Nationalist, Religion, and Communist)" to raise the revolutionary offensive to the peak" (Notosusanto and Basri, 1981, p. 214). Through public meetings, press and radio campaign as well as campaign posters and propaganda boards, figures were at odds with the PKI, condemned and attacked by describing them as "village devils, town devil, capitalist-bureaucratic, counter-revolution, and Necolim (Neo-Colonialism and Neo-Imperialism) agent" who should be killed and exterminated.

In addition to describing the aggressiveness of PKI at the national political arena, Notosusanto and Basri (1981) also narrate the chaos that PKI did in public life. It's told that in many areas, members of the PKI launched one-sided actions. Their cadres incited peasant workers in order to seize land that was not their right with the land reform motto. The actions were followed by physical measures against those they consider as opponents, such as security officers, clerics in schools, and others. The victims had already fallen among the conflicting parties. The whole community anxiously asked when it would explode tension reached its climax.

The history textbook also explains the political crisis as a result of President Soekarno ill. According to a report of the medical team who were imported from China, the president was likely would die or at least paralyzed. Based on developments of the situation, Aidit (Chairman of PKI) decided to change the tactics from parliamentary democracy way to violence. The main target of violence was the Army's top leaders. Notosusanto dan Basri (1981) stated that several months before the bloody coup, the Special Bureau of PKI had launched a smear campaign that leaders of the Army formed a "Council of Generals" which would do a coup against President Sukarno. In a defamation campaign was also spoken that members of the "Council of Generals" was the American and British agent which at the time was stigmatized as "Necolim" (neo-colonialist / neo-imperialist).

The narration of the bloody coup culminated in the killing of the Army top leaders. It is said that in the early morning of 1 October 1965 the 30 September Movement/PKI began its action. The movement was led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung Sutopo, Commander of Cakrabirawa Battalion, the President's personal guards. The Army top leaders who became victims were:

1. Lieutenant General Achmad Yani (Minister /Army Commander).
2. Major General R. Suprpto (Second Deputy of Army Commander).
3. Major General Tirtodarmo Mas Haryono (Deputy III of Army Commander).
4. Major General Suwondo Parman (First Assistant of Army Commander).

5. Brigadier General Donald Izacus Panjaitan (Assistant IV of Army Commander).
6. Brigadier General Soetoyo Siswomihardjo (Inspector / Judge Advocate).
7. First Lieutenant Pierre Andreas Tendean (Adjutant of General Nasution) (Notosusanto and Basri, 1981, p. 217).

Description of the bloody coup of 1965 closed with a narration about the work of the Army under the command of Major General Soeharto to resolve the situation. The same pattern of narrative found in history textbooks for the 1984 curriculum. The difference found that Badrika (1997) made a further trace to the causes of the 1965 bloody coup. The textbook explains that since the DN Aidit was elected as Chairman of PKI in 1951, he quickly built back the strength of PKI and succeed in the 1955 general elections. In the election, PKI could be one of the four major parties in Indonesia.

In addition to searching the cause of the bloody coup, Badrika (1997) used a different perspective when explaining PKI maneuvers at the national political stage. The history textbook explained that the PKI sought to gain power through the parliament, especially in the Soekarno's guided democracy era. However, they also prepared to carry out violence way in an effort to achieve the party's goal, i.e. ruling the Republic of Indonesia state. PKI formed a special agency to secretly charge of preparing cadres in various political organizations, including the cadres in the Armed Forces: army, maritime, air force and police. PKI also tried to influence the President Soekarno to remove and eliminate political opponents. It is shown on the dissolution of the Masjumi Party (*Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia*, Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) and PSI (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia*/ Socialist Party of Indonesia) by the President, even last Murba Party (an Indonesian political party which embraces Trotskyism). In addition, PKI managed to break PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*/ Indonesian National Party) into two. The efforts were taken by PKI to smuggle Ir. Surachman, a PKI leader, into the body PNI (Badrika, 1997).

Badrika also tried to differentiate from the narration of Notosusanto and Basri (1992) through bringing the PKI figure named Kamaruzaman (alias Syam). It is explained that when news about the declining of president's health spread out, DN Aidit took a decision to start a movement. The movement plan was submitted to Kamaruzaman which was appointed as the chairman of the Special Bureau of the PKI and then approved by DN Aidit. Special Bureau contacted its cadres who were members of the Armed Forces such as Brigadier General Suparjo (Army), Lieutenant Colonel Untung (Cakrabirawa), Colonel Sunardi from the Navy, Marshal Omar Dani from the Air Force, and Police Colonel Anwar (Badrika, 1997).

In describing the attempt to break 30 September Movement/ PKI, Badrika also take a different angle. It is narrated on the textbooks that the crackdown on the movement was started in the late afternoon. At 19:15 Special Forces troops under the command of Sarwo Edhi Wibowo had managed to recapture the RRI building and Center of telecommunication building that previously controlled the rebels. After RRI and Center of telecommunication controlled back, Major General Soeharto, as Army top leader made an announcement to people that on October 1, 1965, the coup had occurred and kidnapping several army

leaders. The coup was conducted by a group of contra-revolution called himself as the 30 September Movement. The coup was insurmountable. The people were encouraged to remain calm and vigilant.

Unlike the two previous books, Waridah, Sukardi and Sunarto (2000) more focused on the extermination of 30 September movement/ PKI with providing raw information. For example, the textbook informs that on Friday, October 1, 1965, respectively four news broadcasted as follows:

- a. 07.00 RRI (Radio of the Republic of Indonesia) broadcasted a news that on Thursday, September 30, 1965, in the capital of Indonesia, Jakarta had been a military movement, an army group, called the 30 September Movement. The movement was led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung Sutopo, Cakrabirawa Battalion Commander, the President's private guard. Six generals had been arrested, essential communication tools, as well as other vital objects, had been acquired by the movement. The motion addressed to the generals named Council of Generals. Commander of the 30 September Movement/PKI explained that the Indonesian Revolution Council would be set up at the national level, County Revolutionary Council, District Revolutionary Council, and village-level of Revolutionary Council.
- b. 13.00 RRI proclaimed the Decree No. 1 on the Formation of the Indonesian Revolution Council. The broadcast announced the composition of the September 30th Movement, as follows:
Commander: Brigadier General Supardjo
Deputy Commander: Lt. Col. Heru, Navy Colonel Sunardi, and Police Colonel Anwar
- c. At 19:00 RRI broadcasted a speech Commander of the Army Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad) Major General Soeharto. He announced that the September 30th Movement was a contra-revolutionary movement that had kidnapped several high-ranking leaders of the army and had taken over state power (coup) ...
- d. On the day of October 2, 1965, RRI broadcasted announcements whose contents President as Highest Military Commander/Leader of the Indonesian Revolution Bung Karno in a fit and healthy condition, and still holds the leadership of the country and the revolution (Waridah et al., 2000, p. 55).

The big change on the narration of the 1965 tragedy occurred in 2004 curriculum, known in Indonesia as the Competency-Based Curriculum. Angkasa et al., (2007) opens narration of the bloody coup by stating that at the end of September 1965, Indonesia experienced a dark era. One political party, the PKI had been alleged a rebellion, kidnapping, and murder of the Army top leaders. The event had caused a lot of analysis and debate about the architects and other actors. In the next sentences, history textbook describes the various views about mastermind of the bloody coup of 1965. According to Asvi Warman Adam, the 30 September movement done by political conspiracies of domestic and abroad factions. Foreign interest was US interest in resisting communist forces while the domestic interest was an internal conflict of the army who want to get rid PKI from Sukarno's government. On the other hand, Sir Andrew Gillchrist, the British Ambassador of Indonesia provided analysis that 30 September movement was made to impose the communist party (PKI) through a coup against Soekarno. It would be held on October 5, 1965, and carried out by the army and the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The secret plan was found out by Colonel Untung. With the approval of Aidit and Syam Kamaruzzaman, he moved ahead. However, this plan failed and became a fatal error and PKI was blamed. Different narration made

by Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey. They found that 30 September movement was a crawling coup designed by Soeharto faction against Ahmad Yani faction in the race for the executive position to overthrow Sukarno and destroy the power of communism in Indonesia. On the other hand, state official narration stated that the 30 September 1965 movement was PKI rebellion. Then all the strength of PKI to be suppressed (Angkasa et al., 2007).

In the history textbooks of Tarunasena (2009) which was used for the 2006 Curriculum, the pattern of narration about the bloody coup of 1965 back to the New Order era. Tarunasena textbook (2009) explores the deep background of the coup by explaining maneuver of PKI members in various regions. It is explained that the PKI provoked lower classes of people such as peasants to perform a various one-sided action that causes death and material loss. It's recorded that since 1961 many of individuals and state lands were snatched by farm workers led by cadres of the PKI, such as BTI (*Barisan Tani Indonesia/Indonesian Farmer Front*), People Youth and Gerwani (*Gerakan Wanita/Women Movement*). One sided actions happened in many places, such as (a) Jengkol Incident at 15 November 1961; (b) Indramayu Incident at 18 October 1964; (c) Boyolali Incident at November 1964; (d) Kanigoro Incident at 13 January 1965; and (e) Bandar Betsy Incident at 14 May 1965. Tarunasena (2009) textbook also discusses the incursions made by PKI to the socio-political organization, such as to the Indonesian professional teachers Association (PGRI). It is said that in June 1961 PKI destroyed PGRI to be two, PGRI vaksentral which was loyal to Pancasila and PGRI nonvaksentral which was pro-PKI (p. 69).

The narration of the bloody coup seems to have become a "common knowledge" so that there is no significantly differ from the discourse that was produced and distributed in the New Order era. The similarity between textbooks for curriculum 2006 and those from in the New Order era is also found on the narration of the extermination operation against 30 September movement which was begun conducted on 1 October 1965. Tarunasena (2009) just add information that the military operation against members and sympathizers of PKI or the 30 September Movement /PKI remnant were held by Army and groups of people who still loyal to Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945. Gradually PKI actors were caught, such as Colonel Latif, Lieutenant Colonel Untung Sutopo, Dr. Subandrio, Nyono, Omar Dhani, Kamaruzaman, Sudisman, Oetomo Ramelan, Kol. Sahirman, Mayor Mulyono, and General Supardjo. The extermination operation continues from Jakarta, West Java, Central Java and East Java, then to Bali and beyond.

History textbook for the Curriculum 2013 used patterns as written by Angkasa et al., (2007) which was produced for Curriculum 2004. Sardiman and Lestariningsih (2014, p. 16-17) explains that there were at least six theories about 30 September 1965 bloody coup:

1. 30 September Movement was an internal competition and conflict in Army. The statement was stated by Ben Anderson, W.F.Wertheim, and Coen Hotsapel. From this viewpoint, 30 September movement was just an incident that arises due to internal problems of Army themselves. The statement based on information that comes from Lieutenant Colonel Untung, leader of the 30 September Movement, He said that many Army leaders luxuriated in live and enriching themselves so that defames to Army

institution. Such opinion was in fact contrary to the reality. General Nasution for example. He was Commander of the Army and his life was a simple.

2. Mastermind the 30 September Movement was the United States Intelligence Agency (CIA). This theory comes from the historical writings of Peter Dale Scott and Geoffrey Robinson. According to this theory, the US was very worried about Indonesia fell to the Communists. PKI at the time was indeed the strongest in ensuring influence to Indonesia. The CIA then worked together with a group of Indonesian Army to provoke PKI to conduct a coup movement. After that, PKI was destroyed. The final goal of this scenario was that the CIA overthrow of Sukarno.
3. The 30 September Movement was a fusion of the interests of the UK and the US. According to this theory, the 30 September Movement was the meeting point between the desire of the British who wanted to Soekarno confrontational attitude towards Malaysia could be ended through the overthrow of Sukarno. On the other hand, the US desired to be freed Indonesia from communism. At that time, Sukarno was being an intensively provocation to attack Malaysia which was saying as British puppet state. The theory is designed by Greg Poulgrain.
4. Soekarno was the mastermind behind the 30 September Movement. The theory is stated by Anthony Dake and John Hughes based on the assumption that the Soekarno intended to eliminate the opposition forces that against him, especially the most senior Army officers. Because PKI close to Soekarno, this party was dragged on the Soekarno's scenario. The foundation of the theory came from the testimony of Shri Biju Patnaik, an Indian pilot who became a friend of many Indonesian officials since the revolution. He said that on 30 September 1965 midnight Soekarno asked him to leave Jakarta before dawn. According to Patnaik, Sukarno said, "After that, I'll close the airport". Here Soekarno seemed to know that there would be "a major event" in the next day. But this theory was weakened by the action Sukarno later who refused to support the 30 September movement. Even on October 6, 1965, in Dwikora Cabinet meeting in Bogor, he condemned the movement.
5. No single actor and a great scenario in the 30 September Movement (chaos theory). John D. Legge stated that there was no single mastermind and no great scenario in the G-30. This incident was only the result of the fusion between, as it was called by Sukarno: "elements of Nekolim (Western countries), as well as PKI leaders who were misguided, and elements of the military institution who were not on the track". Everything broke out improvisationally in the field.
6. PKI is the mastermind of the 30 September Movement. According to this theory, PKI leaders were responsible for the bloody coup through manipulating elements of the army. The theory based on series of events and actions that had been launched by PKI from 1959 to 1965. Another fact showed that after the 30 September movement, some violence resistances carried out by a group of people which was calling themselves as the Central Committee. The violence resistances occurred in South Blitar, Grobogan, and Klaten. The theory is developed by Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh. It was the most common theory about the coup on 30 September 1965 in Indonesia, especially in the New Order period.

Although using narrative patterns of Angkasa et al. (2007), Sardiman and Lestariningsih (2014) did not completely abandon the narrative patterns of the New Order era, especially on the explanation of the bloody coup processes and its extermination operation. On the national stage, the textbook explains that

the President Soekarno tried to be a mediation force between two major political groups competing: Amy and PKI.

Sardiman and Lestariningsih (2014) also discusses the one-sided action undertaken by PKI with members of mass supportive organizations. The textbook explains that the one-sided actions were forcefully expropriation attempts to the lands which were belong to established social classes in the village. They reject the old profit-sharing system. PKI used the term "Seven Village Devils" to refer social classes considered as enemies, called evil landlords, usurers, debt bondage persons, bad agrarian brokers, capitalistic village bureaucrat, bad village officials and village bandits. Even the textbook also explains the one-sided actions that occurred in many places, such as Mantingan incident. In the moment, PKI forcibly took Pondok Modern Gontor's 160 hectares waqf land. The action caused the anger of Islamists. Moreover, four months before BTI (*Barisan Tani Indonesia/ Indonesian Farmer Front*) had disrupted mental participants of Indonesian Islamic Student Training and they entering a mosque without removing their muddy footwear.

4. Discussion

Textbooks used in the New Order era produced a very powerful discourse that the mastermind of the 1965 coup was the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). The discourse could clearly be seen at words that used in the title chosen by the author of the textbook. Notosusanto and Basri (1981/1992) as the official textbook used the title of sub-chapter "The betrayal of 30 September movement/PKI", Badrika (1997) chosen the title "The betrayal of the 30 September Movement/PKI (G 30 S/PKI) and its extermination". Parallel to that, Waridah et al., (2000), entitled "The Crushing of 30 September Movement/PKI".

Discourse production that positioning the PKI as an antagonist actor in the story of 1965's bloody coup was strengthened by narration about its attitude shown before 1965. The cunning and bad attitude of PKI is clearly narrated on the textbooks. Notosusanto and Basri (1981) stated that the PKI had to try to achieve their political goals through (1) Interior: PKI tried hard to divide or infiltrate into political parties, mass organizations and other institutions deemed opponent. In the field of education, PKI sought to include Marxism as one of the compulsory subjects. In the field of the military, PKI was trying to indoctrinate its leader with communism and build cells in the body of military; (2) Overseas: tried to deflect Indonesian foreign policy from independent and active foreign policy to became communist bloc. The textbook tried to convince students as the audience that the PKI is not suitable for Indonesia because the internationalist and anti-religious character of communism (Notosusanto & Basri, 1981). Even Badrika (1997) stated that the PKI made Pancasila as only an empty slogan. On the other hand, PKI was also described as the party that had a bad faith, because, at the beginning of 1964, it was found a document about the battle plan of PKI. On the document is written that PKI also had a plan to seize power. PKI tried to seize the state power and furthermore replaced Pancasila with Marxism-Leninism (Notosusanto & Basri, 1981).

Negation is also done by history textbooks against President Soekarno. It was said that the President protected the PKI (Notosusanto & Basri, 1981) and under the influence of the PKI (Badrika, 1997). Consequently, other political parties and Armed Forces could not prosecute the crimes of PKI openly. Through the protection of President Sukarno, PKI, and its mass organizations could safely intimidate and terror against other political parties and figures that considered opponents by saying anyone who opposed Nasakom as anti-PKI, "contra-revolution" and anti-Bung Karno (Notosusanto and Basri, 1981).

In a binary opposition, history textbooks in the Indonesia New Order era made National Army as the protagonist actor. The textbooks portray the military as "the only socio-political force that was organized, who was capable of obstructing the PKI in its efforts to tear down Pancasila" (Notosusanto and Basri, 1981, p. 203). Through the statement, the textbook put the military as the only organized force that guard Pancasila and able to be a tough opponent for PKI. TNI (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia/ The Indonesian Armed Forces*) is also described as a target of the PKI maneuvers. Narrated on the textbook that in many places often occurred that PKI attacked TNI and police officers, as happened in Bandar Betsy (East Sumatra), Boyolali (Central of Java) and Jengkol (East Java). It turned out that the TNI and the police did not back down even though it has fallen victims from among its members such as Auxiliary Lieutenant Sudjono (Notosusanto & Basri, 1981). In fact, before the bloody coup of 1965 occurred, TNI was vilified by PKI. It was rumored that the Army establishing Council Generals which would carry out a coup against President Soekarno and they also said that members of the Council Generals were the agent of Nekolim (USA/UK) (Badrika, 1997).

In addition, to making the military as the protagonist figure, the textbooks of history also create a figure of the Army as a savior hero of the country. The hero name is Major General Soeharto, Commander of *Kostrad (Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat/Army Strategic Reserve Command)*. It was said that after receiving reports about the kidnapping of highest leaders of the Army, he immediately took steps to restore government authority in the capital. Because of the Army leadership became victims of the bloody coup, Major General Soeharto decided to hold the Army leadership temporarily. In order to make the takeover of command is seen as feasible and appropriate, the textbook of history informed that "The move was also in line with the procedural rules, that if the Army commander is absent, then that should represent it is the most senior commander i.e. commander of Kostrad" (Notosusanto & Basri, 1981, p. 218).

The greatness of Major General Soeharto was described as a figure who capable of overcoming the bloody coup trial quickly and without causing many casualties. Textbooks of history in the New Order era narrated that in a short time the betrayal of 30 September movement/PKI was successfully broken, thanks to the loyalty of the people and the Armed Forces who loyal to Pancasila. In the New Order era, Soeharto's success in crushing the rebellion of 30 September movement/ PKI was celebrated annually on October 1 as the Victory Day of Pancasila.

The discourses which were produced through the textbooks of history to negate PKI and President Soekarno as an antagonist figures and the Army as the protagonist figure are not an exclusive claim. The production process of discourse is closely related to the decision the Army Seminar held in Bandung in

1972. The Seminar recommended compiling the history of the military role in Indonesian history, particularly the Army, using various media, such as museums, biography, and film. In 1984, with government sponsorship, Arifin C. Noer managed to make a film docudrama entitled Treachery of 30 September Movement. The film tells the bloody coup of 1965 version of the Army, so the discourse of production was equal to textbooks of history. In the New Order era, the film was screened on national television every 1st of October. Roosa (2006) responded to the massive production of anti-PKI discourse in the New Order era by stating that “under Soeharto anti-communism became the state religion, complete with sacred sites, rituals, and dates. Soeharto's officers turned the site of the murder of the seven army officers in Jakarta on October 1, 1965, Lubang Buaya (Crocodile Hole), into hallowed ground” (p. 7-8).

The production and distribution of discourse that puts communism as a latent threat to Indonesia, both in the classroom and outside of school, will lead the students as the audiences to absorb the discourse as the final truth. In a survey conducted by Tempo magazine in the year of 2000 to 1,110 students found that 97% of respondents that current students had seen the film the Betrayal of 30 September Movement/PKI by Arifin C. Noer. In fact, nearly 40% of respondents Tempo watched more than three times (Rofalina, 2015). Through consuming the medias, ideas and beliefs of students will be affected by the anti-communist discourse produced by New Order. Moreover, until the mid-1990s this official version had been the only account that Indonesians were allowed to mention (Heryanto, 2006). From this viewpoint, it is not surprising that students who were educated in the New Order era or has a close relationship with the Army, shown an anti-communism attitude, as they had shown on the rejection of the symposium of the 1965 tragedy that just took place.

Although the New Order regime had collapsed in 1998, changes in the discourse about the 1965 bloody coup on the history textbooks can not happen soon. It shows that the power of the New Order is still quite strong in the early days of the Reformation. The new textbook of history for the 2004 curriculum change the discourse essentially. At least two aspects of the change that happened. The first is the mention of the bloody coup of 1965 is no longer the G30S / PKI, but only G 30 S. The change shows that PKI is no longer seen as the mastermind behind the bloody coup of 1965. Second, the textbook featuring many interpretations of the bloody coup of 1965, so that students are no longer only obtain a single perspective.

The change in the discourse about the bloody coup of 1965 made controversy spread out. Although from academic and educative viewpoint there is no crucial problem, the change turned out to be very sensitive in terms of politics. Interest groups who believe in the history of the New Order version asked the government that textbooks of history for secondary and high schools that no longer mention PKI as the mastermind behind the bloody coup of 1965 was withdrawn from circulation. Utami (2014) noted that in 2005 some Islamic figures such as Yusuf Hasyim, Taufiq Ismail, and Fadli Zon came to the House of Representative and questioned why in the 2004 curriculum there was no narration about the PKI rebellion in 1965. In the meeting between the Parliament and the Minister of Education, a number of members of X Commission questioned the 1965 bloody coup on textbooks of history which was without mentioning the involvement of the PKI (<http://news.detik.com/> dated June 27, 2005). The controversy

culminated in the withdrawal and ban of history textbooks for 2004 secondary and high school curriculum. The withdrawal and prohibition legally contained in the Letter of Attorney General Decision No. Kep-019 / A / JA / 03/2007 dated March 5, 2007. As a consequence of the decision, the subjects of history backed to the 1994 curriculum.

Trauma to the controversy caused by the removal of the word PKI behind the September 30th Movement, the textbooks of history for the 2006 curriculum mention back that PKI was the mastermind of the bloody coup of 1965. The interesting phenomenon occurred in curriculum implementation 2013. In sub-section title, the textbook of history uses patterns of the New Order, which is "30 September Movement (G30S / PKI)". However, in the explanation, the textbook uses the narrative patterns of the 2004 curriculum.

Prominent discourse produced by the textbooks of history for the 2013 curriculum is that the President tried to be a mediating force between the two major groups of political rivalry which was irreconcilable at that time: the Army and PKI (Sardiman & Lestariningsih, 2014). Narrative produced on history textbooks for the curriculum in 2013 is a counter discourse that produced by the New Order which positioning President Soekarno as the protector of PKI.

5. Conclusion

The political changes from the New Order to Reformation brought profound influence on the production and distribution of discourse about the bloody coup of 1965. In the New Order period, the discourse which was produced and distributed through the textbooks of history was the Army version. It was understandable because the core strength of the New Order was the Army and President Soeharto himself was an Army general. Discourse on the bloody tragedy in 1965 which produced by New Order is that the PKI was the mastermind of the September 30th Movement and President Soekarno protected the PKI. Discourse can be understood from the perspective of power. The bloody tragedy was a political ladder for Soeharto to move from the commander of Kostrad to the President of the Republic of Indonesia. In other words, the bloody tragedy was used as a legitimacy tool for General Soeharto when he became president. So that the Army and General Soeharto were seen as heroes, and in a binary opposition, PKI and Sukarno positioned as the bad guys. Villainization of PKI reinforced by the production of discourse that put it as a latent danger for Indonesia.

When the New Order collapsed in 1998, various discourses of the 1965 tragedy come to the fore and are largely different from the version of the Army. In order to accommodate the growing aspirations in society, the education department launched a new curriculum in 2004 and formalized in 2006. The textbook of history also shown the changes of discourse. The historical narrative is positioned as interpretations of historians. It is different from New Order period who puts historical narrative as the final truth. However, the interest groups supporting the New Order was still too strong, so the narrative patterns of the 2004 curriculum wither before it develops.

The unique solution pursued by history textbooks for the curriculum of 2013. Although the title is still positioning PKI as the mastermind behind the bloody coup of 1965, but the narration of history textbook describes various versions developed among historians. From this standpoint, the textbook of history producing discourse that the PKI was not the mastermind of the bloody coup of 1965. Until this paper was written, there is no opposition to the narrative model used by the textbooks of the history for curriculum 2013, so it can be summed up that the model is acceptable.

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